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LIQUOR, THE LAW, AND CALIFORNIA: ONE STEP
FORWARD-TWO STEPS BACKWARD
California's legislature recently overruled two California
Supreme Court decisions which held that a commercial vendor or
social host who served alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxi-
cated person was liable to any third party injured by the intoxi-
cated person. After discussing the developments preceding the
legislature's action, this Comment argues that the legislature's ex-
emption of the commercial vendor from liability is unwarranted
because the vendor can absorb liability costs by increasing the
product's price. The Comment urges California's next legislative
assembly to reestablish the commercial vendor's liability and pro-
poses alternative theories of liability that may be used to circum-
vent the present legislature's action.
First the man takes a drink,
Then the drink takes a drink,
Then the drink takes the man!1
On September 19, 1978, Governor Brown approved Senate Bill
1645.2 This bill abrogated two recent California Supreme Court
decisions: Vesely v. Sager3 and Coulter v. Superior Court.4 Vesely
and Coulter imposed liability upon the commercial vendor5 and
the social host6 for injuries to third persons caused by the fur-
nishing of intoxicating liquors. Prior to these decisions, California
courts followed a common-law rule that exempted any supplier of
alcoholic beverages from liability for any intoxication-related inju-
ries. S.B. 1645 mandates a return to the common-law position.
Currently, only fourteen states exempt the commercial vendor
from liability by following the common-law rule.7 The majority of
1. E. SuL, An Adage from the Orient, in POETicAL WoRKs OF EDWARD RoW-
LAND SnL 320 (1906).
2. Ch. 929, 1978 Cal. Stats. (to be codified as CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602;
CAT Cry. CODE § 1714). S.B. 1645 became effective on January 1, 1979. CAL. CoNsT.
art. 1, § 8(c) (1).
3. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
4. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
5. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
6. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978).
7. Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1950); Profitt v.
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jurisdictions have abolished the common-law limitation by enact-
ing "Dram Shop Acts"8 or by imposing liability through tradi-
Canez, 118 Ariz. App. 235, 575 P.2d 1261 (1978); Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385
S.W.2d 656 (1965); Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); Stringer v.
Calmes, 167 Kan. 278, 205 P.2d 921 (1949); Waler's Adm'r v. Collinsworth, 144 Ky. 3,
137 S.W. 766 (1911); State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951);
Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget,
Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Marchiondo v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 563 P.2d 1160
(1977); Griffin v. Sebek, - S.D. -, 245 N.W.2d 481 (1976); Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash.
2d 911, 541 P.2d 365 (1975); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566
(1970); Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971).
An argument based upon the weight of these decisions would be suspect. The
decisions in Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin turned on one vote. Meade v.
Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969) (3-2); Griffin v. Sebek, - S.D. -, 245
N.W.2d 481 (1976) (3-2); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970)
(4-3). Alaska has conflicting opinions. Compare Vance v. United States, 355 F.
Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973), with Cherbormier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D.
Alaska 1950). The Kentucky Court of Appeals has stated: "[W]e are unwilling to
say that there are no circumstances under which a licensee who sells alcoholic
beverages may be held responsible in damages. . . ." Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d
626, 629 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). New Mexico's Supreme Court has deferred twice to
its legislature on the issue of a vendor's liability. Its most recent opinion states
that if the legislature does not act, the court's deference will not continue. Mar-
chiondo v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 563 P.2d 1160 (1977). A Washington court of appeals
has subsequently distinguished the state supreme court's decision based on the
defendant's violation of a statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to mi-
nors. Callan v. O'Neil, 20 Wash. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978). The decisions in Ari-
zona, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, and South Dakota hold that liability should be
imposed only by the legislature. Profitt v. Canez, 118 Ariz. App. 235, 575 P.2d 1261
(1978); Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); State ex rel. Joyce v.
Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d
65 (1976); Griffin v. Sebek, - S.D. -, 245 N.W.2d 481 (1976). In California, the
supreme court held the commercial vendor liable to a third party seven years
before the legislature passed S.B. 1645. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151,
95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
8. "Dram Shop Acts" or "Civil Damage Laws" are state statutes that provide
civil remedies for injuries unprotected by the common law. Maine enacted the
first legislation of this type in 1851. Note, Liability Under the Minnesota Civil
Damage Act, 46 MrNN. L. REV. 169, 170 (1961). At present, 18 states have Dram
Shop Acts: ALrA CODE tit. 6, § 5-71(a) (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1958); GA. CODE Am. § 105-1205 (1968); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IowA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West
Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.993 (Supp.
1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.055
(1973); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 11-101 (McKinney 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06
(1975); Orio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4399.01-.02 (Baldwin 1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.730
(1977); R.L GEN. LAws §§ 3-11-1 to -2 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972); Wls.
STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (West Supp. 1978); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 12-5-502 (1977).
The language of the statutes is generally to the effect that any person who fur-
nishes intoxicating liquor is liable in damages for any injuries occasioned "by any
intoxicated person" or "in consequence of the intoxication of any person." Al-
though this broad-brush language sounds in tort, it is generally agreed that these
statutes were not enacted to alleviate the harsh results obtained at common law.
See Hagglund & Arthur, Common Law Liquor Liability, 7 FORUM 73, 75 (1972);
Sharp, Dram Shop Laws and Problems, 28 ALA. LAw. 409, 409 (1967); Comment, So.
cial Host Liabilityfor Furnishing-Finding a Basis for Recovery in Kentucky, 3 N.
Ky. L, REV. 229, 231 (1976). But see Comment, Torts: Liability of the Social
Purveyor, 28 OxiA. L, REV. 204, 204 (1975). Rather, the statutes arose out of the
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tional negligence mechanisms. 9 Despite this fact, California's
legislature has immunized the commercial vendor from liability
by enacting S.B. 1645. This Comment will determine whether the
legislature's reestablishment of the seldom-followed minority rule
is a reasonable course of action.
The Comment will commence with a discussion of the common-
law rule. After this discussion the judicial and legislative devel-
opments surrounding the rule will be examined. The Comment
will then focus upon the policy considerations attendant to this
area of liability and conclude that in light of these considerations,
the legislature's exemption of the commercial vendor from liabil-
ity is an untenable position. Last, alternative theories of liability
will be investigated. At common law, there were exceptions to
the general rule denying liability, and these exceptions may pro-
vide a remedy against the liquor purveyor notwithstanding S.B.
1645.
efforts of prohibitionists to control the evils associated with liquor trafficking. See
DeMoulin & Whitcomb, Social Host's Liability in Furnishing Alcoholic Beverages,
27 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 349, 350 (1977); Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in
California, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 46, 51 (1973).
Consequently, many statutes contain restrictions and limitations that have lost
their logic and raison d' tre with the passage of time and the end of prohibition.
Alabama imposes strict liability upon the liquor purveyor. See Phillips v. Derrick,
36 Ala. App. 244, 54 So. 2d 320 (1951). Phillips examines a statute identical to Ala-
bama's present statute, ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 5-71(a) (1975). This statute prohibits a
defendant from demonstrating that due care was exercised when providing the li-
quor to the consumer. Other states impose liability if the defendant has contrib-
uted to the consumer's intoxication "in whole or in part." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
103 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
This standard places an onerous burden upon the defendant. Once a consumer
enters his tavern and imbibes but one drink, the defendant is thereafter responsi-
ble irrespective of the consumer's subsequent actions.
Dram Shop Acts can also work a hardship on plaintiffs. Some states place re-
strictions on the amount of damages a plaintiff may recover. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 30-102 (West 1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1978). States that do not impose restric-
tions upon damages may limit standing to a specified class of persons. GA. CODE
ANN. § 105-1205 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.055 (1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.730
(1977); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 12-5-502 (1977). Statutes that contain notice require-
ments pose an additional obstacle to plaintiffs: If the vendor does not receive no-
tice, prior to sale, that the liquor must not be dispensed, he cannot be held liable.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); R.L GEN. LAWS §§ 3-11-1 to -2 (1976); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 176.35 (West Supp. 1978). Thus, even though an injured party may have a
remedy against a liquor purveyor under accepted principles of negligence, an illog-
ical provision in an antiquated Dram Shop Act may prevent recovery.
9. E.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959);
Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978);
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
THE COmMON-LAw RULE DENYING LIABILITY
At common law, the gift or sale of intoxicating liquor to an
ablebodied man was not a tort.10 Consequently, no liability was
imposed upon the commercial vendor or social host for furnishing
intoxicating liquor to a customer or guest who injured himself"
or an innocent third party12 as a result of his intoxication.
The foundation of the common-law rule was the notion that the
consumption rather than the furnishing of the liquor was the
proximate cause of the injury.13 The rationale was that although
there might be a sale without intoxication, there could be no in-
toxication without consumption.14 Further support for the rule
was found in a prevailing concept of common-law justice-the
ethic of individual responsibility.15 Courts believed that those
who drank excessively should be solely responsible for the dele-
terious results wrought by their intoxication.1 6
Prior to 1971, California courts uniformly adhered to the com-
mon-law rule.'7 Although this adherence engendered harsh re-
sults, the courts believed that any changes in the rule would
require legislative action.'8 This position was abandoned by the
California Supreme Court in Vesely v. Sager.19
10. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 234, 20 N.E. 7R, 74 (1889); H. BLACK, A TREATISE
ON THE LAWS REGULATING THE MANUFACTURE AND SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS
§ 281 (1892); 45 AM. JuR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969). It is interesting that
the rule stated in Cruse was dictum with citation to analogous authority only.
11. In addition to the common-law rule, the liquor purveyor could rely heavily
upon the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. E.g., King v. Henkie, 80
Ala. 505 (1886). See Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in California, 14 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 46, 71-75 (1973); Comment, Negligence Actions Against Liquor Purveyors: Fill.
ing the Gap in South Dakota, 23 S.D. L. REv. 227, 230 (1978).
12. 45 AM. Jun. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 833
(1961).
13. King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505 (1886); Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d
54 (1969); Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d
396 (Wyo. 1971).
14. Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 290, 162 P.2d 125, 127 (1945).
15. Johnson, Drunken Driving-The Civil Responsibility of the Purveyor of In-
toxicating Liquor, 37 IND. L.J. 317, 323 (1962).
16. "Human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts." State
ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (1951).
17. The rule was first stated by way of dictum in Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry.,
186 Cal. 379, 199 P. 523 (1921). The rule was thereafter followed in three major
cases: Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952
(1943) (dictum).
18. E.g., Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 354, 289 P.2d 450, 456 (1955).
19. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). Two landmark cases are
discussed at length in Vesely. The decisions undoubtedly provided some impetus
to the Vesely court's decision, and they are worth noting. In Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), the plaintiffs, residents of Michigan,
brought an action against three Illinois tavern keepers for selling liquor to Illinois
residents who drove their automobile into Michigan and collided with the plain-
[vor. 16: 355, 1979] Comments
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CALTFoRNiA's JUDIcIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE
COMMON-LAw RuLE
The Court and the Commercial Vendor
The complaint in Vesely alleged that the defendant, Sager,
owned and operated the Buckhorn Lodge, a tavern located near
the top of Mount Baldy in California's San Bernardino County.
On the evening of April 8, 1968, Sager served intoxicating liquors
to his customer, O'Connell, from approximately 10 p.m. until 5:15
the following morning. As the evening progressed, Sager realized
that O'Connell was becoming excessively intoxicated and that he
"was 'incapable of exercising the same degree of volitional control
over his consumption of intoxicants as the average reasonable
person.' "20 Sager also knew that when O'Connell left the lodge,
he would drive down a steep, winding, narrow mountain road. Af-
ter leaving the tavern, O'Connell crossed into the opposing lane of
traffic while traveling the mountain road and collided with
Vesely's vehicle.
The trial court dismissed Vesely's claim for damages against
Sager pursuant to the common-law rule then in effect. On appeal,
the California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and held
that liability may be imposed upon a vendor of intoxicating li-
quors for providing liquor to an obviously intoxicated customer
who, as a result of his intoxication, injures a third person.2 1
The first issue the court examined was the common-law notion
that the consumption of liquor is the proximate cause of all intox-
tiffs' vehicle. Both Michigan and Illinois had a Dram Shop Act, but neither Act ap-
plied extraterritorially. Nevertheless, the court held that the complaint stated a
cause of action under Michigan common law. This finding was based on the tav-
ern keepers' violation of an Illinois statute making it a misdemeanor to furnish li-
quor to intoxicated individuals. This statute imposed a duty upon the Illinois
tavern keepers, the breach of which made them liable to the Michigan plaintiffs.
In Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959), a widow brought an action
against four tavern keepers for selling liquor to an obviously intoxicated minor
whose vehicle collided with her husband. As in Waynick, the court based its anal-
ysis on a statute providing criminal sanctions for furnishing liquor to intoxicated
individuals or minors. The court determined that the statute was enacted to pro-
tect members of the general public and concluded that "[i]f the patron is a minor
or is intoxicated when served, the tavern keeper's sale to him is unlawful; and if
the circumstances are such that the tavern keeper knows or should know that the
patron is a minor or is intoxicated, his service ... may... constitute common
law negligence." Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 9.
20. 5 Cal. 3d at 157-58, 486 P.2d at 154, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 626 (quoting plaintiffs
complaint).
21. Id. at 157, 486 P.2d at 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
ication-related injuries. In a unanimous opinion, the court stated
that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated patron
could be a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by that patron
upon a third person.22 This conclusion was based upon the belief
that the consumption of the liquor may be only a foreseeable in-
tervening cause of the injury-producing conduct.23 The court's
reasoning is clearly a marked departure from the common-law no-
tion of proximate cause. However, the court stated that the cen-
tral issue in Vesely was not one of proximate cause, but rather
one of duty.24
The existence of a duty can be determined by diverse meth-
ods.25 In Vesely, the court held that Sager owed a duty to Vesely
based upon California Business and Professions Code section
25602.26 This statute provides: "Every person who sells, furnishes
[or] gives... any alcoholic beverages to any... obviously intox-
icated person is guilty of a misdemeanor."2 7 This statute is
clearly penal in character and does not provide for civil liability.
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that because the statute was
"adopted for the purpose of protecting members of the general
public from injuries ... resulting from the excessive use of intox-
icating liquor,"28 a presumption of negligence arises whenever its
provisions are violated.29 Consequently, the court concluded that
because Sager violated the statute by serving alcoholic beverages
to O'Connell while he was obviously intoxicated, Sager was pre-
22. Id. at 164, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Apart from the method used in Vesely, a court may determine the exist-
ence of a duty by balancing social interests and policies. See W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971).
26. 5 Cal. 3d at 157, 486 P.2d at 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
27. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964).
28. 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631. The court stated that
this reasoning was compelled by CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1964). In
pertinent part, this statute provides:
This division [including section 25602] is [enacted] for the protection of
the safety, welfare, health, peace and morals of the people of the State, to
eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful manufacture, selling and
disposing of alcoholic beverages, and to promote temperance in the use
and consumption of alcoholic beverages.
29. This presumption is codified in CAL. Evm. CODE § 669(a) (West Supp.
1978). This § provides:
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute... ;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or prop-
erty;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which
the statute ... was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property
was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was
adopted.
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sumed to have breached the duty of due care that he owed
Vesely. Although section 25602 applies to "every person," the
Vesely court expressly stated that its holding was limited to com-
mercial vendors.3 0 In April, 1978, the court lifted this limitation in
Coulter v. Superior Court.31
The Court and the Social Host
In Coulter, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was injured
when the car in which he was riding as a passenger collided with
roadway abutments. 32 The driver of the vehicle, Janice Williams,
had been served large quantities of alcoholic beverages immedi-
ately before the accident. These beverages were furnished in the
recreation room of an apartment complex which was owned and
operated by defendant Schwartz & Reynolds & Co. and managed
by defendant Montgomery.
The complaint further alleged that the defendants knew or
should have known that Williams "customarily drank to excess" 33
and was "incapable of exercising the same degree of volitional
control over her consumption of alcoholic beverages as the aver-
age reasonable person;"34 that Williams was becoming "exces-
sively intoxicated" 35 on this occasion; that the defendants knew
that Williams intended to operate an automobile following her
consumption of the alcoholic beverages; and that the defendants
knew or should have known that their conduct would expose
third persons such as the plaintiff to "foreseeable serious risk of
harm."36
Justice Richardson penned the opinion and concluded that the
allegations established a cause of action against the defendants.
This conclusion was grounded upon two propositions. First, sec-
tion 25602 of the California Business and Professions Code is not
limited to persons who furnish liquor to others for a profit.3 7 Sec-
30. 5 Cal. 3d at 157, 486 P.2d at 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
31. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
32. The plaintiff's wife, Deborah Coulter, joined in the action with her hus-
band and claimed as damages loss of consortium and the value of nursing services
rendered to her husband. Id. at 147, 577 P.2d at 670, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.




37. See text accompanying note 24 supra. As stated, § 25602 is a misdemeanor
statute that penalizes every person who furnishes alcoholic beverages to an obvi-
ond, a social host or other noncommercial provider of alcoholic
beverages, regardless of statute, owes to the general public a duty
to refuse to furnish such beverages to an obviously intoxicated
person if the person constitutes a reasonably foreseeable danger
or risk of injury to third persons.38
The Legislature
Less than five months after the Coulter decision, Governor
Brown approved S.B. 1645.39 As stated in the introduction, S.B.
1645 exempts both the social host and the commercial vendor
from civil liability 4O for furnishing intoxicating liquors. The bill
also reestablishes the common-law notion that the consumption
of liquor, rather than the furnishing of it, is the proximate cause
of any injuries. In pertinent part, the bill reads:
No person who sells, furnishes [or] gives ... any alcoholik beverage [to
any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person]
shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for
injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the con-
sumer of such alcoholic beverage.
The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so
that the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager... and Coulter v. Supe-
rior Court ... be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation
41
Initially, the legislature's resurrection of the common-law no-
tion of proximate cause is difficult to comprehend. Common
sense compels a conclusion that any intoxication-related injury
can be caused by both the consumption and the furnishing of the
ously intoxicated individual. The court reasoned that on its face this statute ap-
plies with equal force to commercial vendors and to social hosts. More important,
the court determined that the legislature intended the statute to apply to social
hosts or, perhaps more accurately, that the legislature did not intend to exclude
judicial imposition of liability upon the social host. See 21 Cal. 3d at 150-52, 575
P.2d at 672-73, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38.
38. The court's imposition of this duty is based upon an analysis of certain fac-
tors. These factors include
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between defen-
dant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of im-
posing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost, and prevelance of insurance for the risk involved.
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1969). For the court's discussion of these factors, see 21 Cal. 3d at 153-54, 577 P.2d
at 674-75, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40.
39. Ch. 929, 1978 Cal. Stats. (to be codified as CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602,
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714).
40. However, "[e]very person who sells, furnishes, [or] gives ... any alco-
holic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxi-
cated person is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
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liquor. However, because proximate cause is often an instrument
of social policy,4 2 the legislature's action is not as incomprehensi-
ble as it would otherwise appear to be.
California's legislature does not publish a record of its findings
and debates. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to determine
which social policies the legislators considered sufficiently impor-
tant to warrant the enactment of S.B. 1645.43 The following sec-
tion will set forth the relevant policy considerations and
determine their applicability to the social host and the commer-
cial vendor.
THE SOCIAL HOST V. THE COMMERCIAL VENDOR: A QUESTION OF
POLICY
Enterprise Liability: The Cost of Doing Business
The cornerstone of the enterprise liability theory is the princi-
ple that an entrepreneur is best equipped to absorb the cost of
any losses that might accompany the sale of his product. 44 Unlike
the individual, the entrepreneur can distribute losses or insur-
ance costs to the buying public by raising the price of the product.
This theory clearly applies to the commercial vendor of intoxicat-
ing liquors. 45
The vendor, simply by raising the price of a drink, can compen-
sate or insure against the losses caused by the purveyance of al-
42. W. PaOSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971). "[Plroximate causa-
tion is a matter of public policy and therefore subject to the changing attitudes
and needs of society." Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756, 761 (D. Alaska
1973).
43. To determine the legislative intent of S.B. 1645, this writer mailed a ques-
tionnaire (on file with the San Diego Law Review) to every Senator and Assem-
blyman who voted on the bill. The questionnaire asked five questions: "Do you
believe the commercial vendor should be held liable? Why? Do you believe the
social host should be held liable? Why? If you answered the above questions dif-
ferently, why did you vote as you did?"
The writer mailed 102 questionnaires and received a grand total of eight re-
sponses. Two responses did not answer the questions asked. Unfortunately, the
legislature's collective state of mind concerning these questions cannot be deter-
mined from six responses.
44. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963). Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
45. "If normal economic principles hold true, the costs of higher insurance
premiums for the vendor would be absorbed by an increase in the price of alco-
holic beverages offered to the public." Comment, Negligence Actions Against Li-
quor Purveyors: Filling the Gap in South Dakota, 23 S.D. L. REV. 227, 232 (1978).
cohol.46 Moreover, the consumers absorbing this increase will be
those who imbibe alcohol. Because these consumers are the very
persons who generate the risk-producing activity, it is both sensi-
ble and equitable to require them to absorb the increased
prices.47
Vendors argue that the cost of insurance is not affordable. 48 As-
suming that premium increases are based upon actual loss expe-
rience,49 what follows from the vendor's argument is that the
consumer is no longer willing to purchase the product when it re-
flects the losses it generates. Once this state is reached, the
losses must be decreased or the product must be removed from
the market place. An argument that contends liability should not
be imposed upon the commercial purveyor because he cannot af-
ford to pay for the damages his product engenders has no merit.
As opposed to the commercial vendor, the social host does not
furnish alcoholic beverages for pecuniary gain. The host's pur-
veyance is generally an act of hospitality and generosity. Conse-
quently, the host would have to absorb personally the cost of any
insurance or damage awards. Thus, imposition of liability on the
social host does not comport with the principle of the enterprise
liability theory.5o
"Obviously Intoxicated"
Not drunk is he who from the floor
Can rise alone and still drink more;
But drunk is he, who prostrate lies,
Without the power to drink or rise.5 1
46. In 1972 there were 9,624 "drinking places" in California. The total sales of
these establishments amounted to $668,150,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CEN-
SUS OF RETAIL TRADE 1972, AREA SERIES, CALIFORNIA, RC 72-A-5 1974 (table 1).
"Drinking places" are establishments engaged primarily in the retail sale of
drinks. STATIsTicAL PoLIcY DMvISION, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
UNITED STATES EXEcIrivE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLAS-
SIFICATION MANUAL 1972, at 271. These figures indicate that the commercial vendor
is well-equipped to absorb the losses his business causes.
47. "[Tlhe cost of the vendor's liability insurance will be reflected in the price
of his product, resulting in the cost of liquor-caused injuries being borne ulti-
mately by the class of imbibers." Comment, Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial
Response, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 995, 1017 (1969).
48. See Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 874 n.11, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 622
n.11 (1976); L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 6, 1978, at 19, col. 4.
49. "If the increases are not based upon loss experience, they are indicative of
a need for inquiry into the rate-fixing practices of the insurance industry." Kindt
v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 874 n.11, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 622 n.11 (1976).
50. DeMoulin & Whitcomb, Social Host's Liability in Furnishing Alcoholic
Beverages, 27 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 349, 357 (1977).
51. Cooper v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 394 n.1, 119
Cal. Rptr. 541, 544 n.1 (1975). In Cooper, Justice Fleming stated: "Visual diagnosis
of intoxication has not greatly improved upon [this] rough and ready classification
.... .' !d.
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The supreme court, in Vesely, determined that the duty of due
care owed to third persons arose when liquor was given to an "ob-
viously intoxicated" individual. However, to determine when a
person is "obviously intoxicated" is a difficult question indeed. In
Coulter, the court adopted a standard announced in People v.
Johnson:52
The use of intoxicating liquor by the average person in such quantity as to
produce intoxication causes many commonly known outward manifesta-
tions which are "plain" and "easily seen or discovered." If such outward
manifestations exist and the seller still serves the customer so affected he
has violated the law, whether this was because he failed to observe what
was plain and easily seen or discovered, or because, having observed, he
ignored that which was apparent.5 3
Although this standard may prove workable within the context of
a commercial transaction, it should not be used to impose liability
upon the social host.5 4
The commercial vendor is akin to an expert in his field. His
daily observations of those who drink intoxicating liquors results
in his familiarity with the manifestations of an intoxicated indi-
vidual. The social host, on the other hand, is not in the business
of dispensing alcoholic beverages. His contacts with the inebriate
occur less frequently. Consequently, the host has greater difficul-
ties discerning the manifestations indicative of intoxication.55 In
Cooper v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,5 6 Justice Fleming
aptly observed: "Obvious intoxication is often recognizable only
after the fact, and what is patent when the drinker falls off his
stool... may have been only latent 60 seconds earlier."5 7
Large social gatherings create additional problems. At wedding
receptions, class reunions, and large parties, the host will not be
52. 81 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 185 P.2d 105 (1947).
53. Id. at 975-76, 185 P.2d at 106 (emphasis original). The Coulter court stated
that although the phrase "obviously intoxicated" is "contained in section 25602, a
criminal statute,.. . the courts have experienced no discernible difficulty in ap-
plying it." 21 Cal. 3d at 155, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540 (emphasis origi-
nal). See Samaras v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 180 Cal. App. 2d 842,
844, 4 Cal. Rptr. 857, 858 (1960); People v. Smith, 94 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 975, 977-78,
210 P.2d 98, 99-100 (1949).
54. See generally Cooper v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 389,
394 n.1, 119 Cal. Rptr. 541, 544 n.1 (1975).
55. Id. An additional problem is created by consumers who appear sober
when they are inebriated and those who appear inebriated when they are in fact
sober. See generally Note, Statutory Interpretation of the "Dram Shop Act"-The
Majority Rule, 49 N.D. L. REV. 72, 80 (1972).
56. 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 119 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1975).
57. Id. at 394 n.1, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 544 n.1.
able to observe all guests and to determine their states of intoxi-
cation before they receive drinks.5 8 The commercial vendor, how-
ever, necessarily confronts his patron whenever a sale is made. 9
This confrontation affords the vendor an opportunity to observe
his patron's demeanor and to refuse service if the patron seems
obviously intoxicated.
Deterrence, Supervision, and Refusal to Serve
/
Another policy suggested for imposing civil liability upon the li-
quor purveyor is to deter the purveyor from furnishing alcoholic
beverages to obviously intoxicated individuals.60 In a commercial
setting, this reasoning is well-founded.
The commercial vendor knows or should know of the civil liabil-
ities attendant to his profession. By continually observing his
patrons6 ' and refusing to serve them if they are obviously intoxi-
cated, the vendor knows that he can avoid liability. The same
cannot be said for the social host.
As opposed to the commercial vendor, a social host furnishes
alcoholic beverages only at social gatherings, and these gather-
ings do not occur as frequently as the vendor's daily sale of li-
quor. The social host is less likely to be aware of any civil liability
that may accrue from furnishing intoxicating liquors.62 Assuming,
however, that the social host is aware of the potential liability, it
is arguable whether the host can effectively police the activities of
his guests. 63 Furthermore, even if he were in continual contact
with his guests, it is unrealistic to expect that any admonition
from the host to the guest that "he has had enough" would be ef-
fective.
58. Note, Statutory Interpretation of the "Dram Shop Act"--The Majority Rule,
49 N.D. L. REv. 72, 80 (1972).
59. Id.
60. Comment, Torts-Negligence-Social Host Who Furnishes Alcoholic Bever-
ages to Minor May Be Held Liable for Minor's Negligent Acts, 8 RUT.-CAMi. L.J. 719,
723 (1977).
61. This argument assumes that any knowledge the vendor's employee has
concerning a patron's state of intoxication should be imputed to the vendor.
62. See DeMoulin & Whitcomb, Social Host's Liability in Furnishing Alcoholic
Beverages, 27 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 349, 357 (1977).
63.
[Elxtending liability to the noncommercial vendor would result in great
social pressure being applied to such individuals and require their polic-
ing the activities of friends and social guests. Assuming for the moment
that such results are beneficial, it is questionable just how much success
an individual would have in playing out his role in the atmosphere of a
private gathering.
Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 734, 176 N.W.2d 566, 570-71 (1970).
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FINDING A BASIS FOR RECOVERY IN CALIFORNIA: ALTERNATIVE
THEORIES OF LIABIIY
As stated previously, S.B. 1645 "abrogate[s] [Vesely and
Coulter] in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alco-
holic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries .... 64 At
first blush, the bill seems to preclude the imposition of any liabil-
ity upon the liquor purveyor. Upon closer examination, the blush
fades.
To obviate the harsh results obtained at common law, courts de-
veloped exceptions to the general rule denying liability, and Cali-
fornia's "prior judicial interpretation" has recognized or followed
these exceptions. 65 Based upon these exceptions, an injured
party may have a cause of action against the liquor purveyor
notwithstanding S.B. 1645.
The Aggravating Circumstances Exception at Common Law
As previously elucidated, the common-law rule applied only
when there was a sale or gift of intoxicating liquor to an able-
bodied man.66 This qualification provided courts with a mecha-
nism that could be used to circumvent the rule's application. An
often-cited decision that illustrates this procedure is McCue v.
Klein,67 an early Texas decision.
In McCue, the consumer was "an habitual drunkard, who, from
long and excessive use of spirituous liquors, had so beclouded his
mind and fettered his will that he was wholly incapable of re-
sisting his appetite for strong drink. ... 68 The defendants, with
full knowledge of the consumer's circumstance, conspired to in-
64. Ch. 929, § 1, 1978 Cal. Stats. (emphasis added) (to be codified as CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 25602; CAL CIV. CODE § 1714).
65.
"It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the
Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judi-
cial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of
such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them." The failure of the
legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is
generally before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of
an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended.
Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 355, 289 P.2d 450, 456 (1955) (quoting Buckley v. Chad-
wick, 45 CaL 2d 183, 200, 288 P.2d 12, 22 (1955)).
66. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
67. 60 Tex. 168 (1883).
68. Id. at 169.
duce him to swallow three pints of whiskey in quick succession.
After the consumer had ingested two of the three pints, a by-
stander warned the defendants that the imbibition of the remain-
ing pint would cause the consumer's death. Unfortunately for
both the consumer and the defendants, the bystander's prediction
proved accurate. The court adjudged the defendants liable and
granted relief to the deceased's widow.
Several elements that are prerequisites to a cause of action
under an aggravating circumstances exception can be gleaned
from McCue. Because the gravamen of the exception is that the
consumer is not ablebodied when he drinks the liquor, it follows
that plaintiff must first prove the consumer was unable to resist
drinking the liquor.6 9 If the plaintiff can pass this barrier, he must
then show that the defendant had knowledge of the consumer's
circumstance70 and, notwithstanding this knowledge, continued
to furnish the liquor that caused the consumer's death.7 1 Once
plaintiff proves these elements, he has established a cause of ac-
tion against the purveyor.7 2 McCue is silent, however, as to
whether the cause of action is applicable to both commercial and
social purveyors of liquor. Ibach v. Jackson73 suggests that the
McCue exception is available in both instances.
The facts, in Ibach are unappetizing at best. The complaint al-
leged that the defendant enticed the plaintiffs intestate to his ho-
tel room and plied her with liquor until she had lost all sense of
reason and volition. Unable to control her movements while in
such a state, the deceased fell and sustained severe injuries. Al-
though the defendant knew that that the deceased was intoxi-
cated and severely injured, he abandoned her. Shortly thereafter,
she died.
A cursory glance at the opinion indicates that the Ibach court
intended to apply the McCue holding. The court first extracted
69. Id. at 170.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Commentators agree with this analysis. See Johnson, Drunken Driving
-The Civil Responsibility of the Purveyor of Intoxicating Liquor, 37 IND. L.J. 317,
318 (1962); Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in California, 14 SANTA CLARA LAw. 46,
49 (1973); Sharp, Dram Shop Laws and Problems, 28 ALA. LAw. 409, 414 (1967).
However, it must be noted that the court spoke in terms of assault:
Admitting that the allegations show that the deceased had, at the time he
consented to drink such an excessive quantity of spirits, sufficient con-
sciousness to know the injury it was likely to cause him, still the act of the
defendants cannot be excused because he consented to an experiment
which might end in his death, or at least in doing him great bodily harm.
The rule of law is clear that consent to an assault is no justification.
60 Tex. at 170.
73. 148 Or. 92, 35 P.2d 672 (1934).
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the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint necessary to establish a
cause of action under McCue: that the deceased had "lost all
sense of reason and volition" and that the defendant continued to
serve intoxicating liquor to her despite his knowledge of her con-
dition.74 The court then quoted extensively from McCue75 and
concluded that the plaintiff's complaint stated a cognizable claim
for damages. The court did not, however, discuss Ibach's most
distinguishing feature-the fact that the defendant was a social
host rather than a commercial vendor. Neither Ibach nor McCue
have 'been cited in California's decisional law. However, Califor-
nia courts have considered analogous factual patterns.
The Aggravating Circumstances Exception Under California
Law
The leading pre-Vesely case in California is Cole v. Rush.76 In
Cole, the plaintiff, Mrs. Cole, brought an action for the death of
her husband, who was killed while fighting with one of the de-
fendant's customers. The complaint alleged that the defendant
knew that Mr. Cole, although "normally of quiet demeanor,"77 be-
came "belligerent, pugnacious and quarrelsome" 78 when drunk.
Furthermore, the complaint stated that Mrs. Cole had on numer-
ous occasions requested the defendants "not to sell or furnish in-
toxicating beverages to [her husband] sufficient to allow him to
become intoxicated thereon.'79 Despite these allegations, the
court denied relief to Mrs. Cole. The court indicated, however,
that if Mrs. Cole had alleged that her husband was not a "compe-
tent person," the complaint would have stated a cause of action.8 0
Although the Cole court did not state what constitutes a "compe-
tent" person, Dwan v. Dixon8l sheds some light on the definition.
In Dwan, the plaintiff and his parents were riding in an automo-
bile which collided with Froberg's vehicle. Before the accident,
Froberg had consumed several drinks while visiting the defend-
ants, Frank and Marie Dixon. The plaintiff's original complaint al-
74. Id. at 96, 35 P.2d at 674.
75. Id. at 103-04, 35 P.2d at 677.
76. 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955).
77. Id. at 347, 289 P.2d at 451.
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis original).
80. Id. at 356, 289 P.2d at 457.
81. 216 Cal. App. 2d 260, 30 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1963).
leged that the Dixons had furnished the beverages to Froberg
even though they knew that Froberg was strongly influenced by
the use of alcohol and that his demeanor did not always reveal
this influence. Additionally, the complaint stated that the Dixons
knew that Froberg would be operating his automobile when he
left their home. On these allegations, the lower court entered a
demurrer with leave to amend.
The plaintiff's amended complaint averred that the Dixons had
"conducted" 82 Froberg to his car, put him into it, headed him for
the highway, and "aided and abetted"8 3 him in driving it away
from the premises. Once again, the court dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint. However, this time the dismissal was entered on pro-
cedural grounds.
To support their original complaint, the plaintiffs had filed affi-
davits. These affidavits stated that the Dixons had neither " put"
Froberg into his vehicle nor "aid[ed] and assist[ed]" him in leav-
ing the premises. 84 The court stated that on these facts the stan-
dards of truthful pleading required a dismissal of the amended
complaint. However, if the court had not dismissed the amended
complaint on procedural grounds, the alleged aggravating circum-
stances would have stated a cause of action regardless of the com-
mon-law rule then in effect. Although the Dwan court did not cite
McCue or Ibach, the analogies are apparent.
According to McCue and Ibach, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) the consumer was in such a state as to be deprived of his
reason and willpower, and (2) the defendant continued to furnish
alcohol to the consumer even though he knew of the consumer's
condition. In Dwan, the plaintiffs alleged that the Dixons knew
that Froberg was a heavy drinker, that Froberg was easily influ-
enced by the use of alcohol, that Froberg's intoxicated condition
was not manifested in a change of demeanor, and that the Dixons
"put" Froberg into his car. Although these allegations do not ap-
proach the level of aggravation displayed in McCue and in Ibach,
the Dwan court indicated that the allegations would have pre-
vented the application of the common-law rule if they had been
pleaded truthfully. A decision of recent vintage that buttresses
this indication is Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, Inc.85
On the night of April 13, 1971, the plaintiff's intestate, Christo-
pher Ewing, entered the Cloverleaf Bowl with several companions
to celebrate his twenty-first birthday. The defendant, Lamont, a
82. Id. at 263, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 264, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
85. 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
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bartender with approximately twelve years of experience, asked
for Christopher's identification and upon receiving it supplied
Christopher with a vodka collins "on the house." After consum-
ing the drink, Christopher stated, "I'm twenty-one and I'm not
even drunk."86 To alleviate this condition, Christopher consumed
ten straight shots of 151-proof rum and two beer chasers in a pe-
riod of less than one and one-half hours. After consuming these
liquors, Christopher entered a state of unconsciousness. His com-
panions dragged him out of the Cloverleaf Bowl and took him to
his parents' home. On the following morning, Christopher's
mother discovered that he was dead.
At trial, the court granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit,
finding as a matter of law that the bartender's actions did not con-
stitute willful misconduct. On appeal, the California Supreme
Court reversed this finding. Justice Tobriner, writing for the
court, concluded inter alia that a jury could reasonably find that
Lamont engaged in willful misconduct.87
Justice Tobriner defined willful misconduct as the intentional
doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its conse-
quences or with knowledge that the act will probably cause seri-
ous injury.88 To determine whether Lamont's conduct reached
the level of willful misconduct, Justice Tobriner examined the
"salient aspects" of Lamont's activities.
The justice listed at least eight aspects that he considered sali-
ent.89 However, he did not disclose which aspects are essential to
establishing a cause of action. This non-disclosure is to plaintiff's
advantage. By interpreting Justice Tobriner's "salient aspects"
liberally, a court may be able to establish a willful misconduct
86. Id. at 396, 572 P.2d at 1157, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
87. Id. at 402, 572 P.2d at 1161, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
88. Id. at 402, 572 P.2d at 1161, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
89. The aspects are: (1) Lamont acted intentionally, (2) Lamont knew that
Christopher was an inexperienced drinker, (3) Lamont knew of the radical differ-
ence in proof between ordinary liquor and 151-proof rum and could have con-
cluded that Christopher was unaware of these differences, (4) Lamont knew
Christopher intended to get drunk, (5) Lamont knew that his warning to Christo-
pher to take it easy had been without effect, (6) Lamont could have concluded, or
should have concluded, that Christopher might consume an amount of liquor haz-
ardous to his health, (7) Lamont knew or should have known, in light of his expe-
rience, that beyond a certain level consumption of alcohol creates an immediate
health hazard, and (8) Lamont acted in violation of two rules of practice at the
Cloverleaf Bowl-he repeatedly filled the shot glasses beyond the seven-eighths
line, and he continued to serve Christopher after he was obviously intoxicated. Id.
at 402-03, 572 P.2d at 1162, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
cause of action in cases in which S.B. 1645 would otherwise pre-
clude liability.
In sum, by combining Ewing, Dwan, and Cole, a plaintiff may
be able to circumvent the application of S.B. 1645 and establish a
cause of action against any liquor purveyor. The possibility of es-
tablishing this cause of action will most likely turn upon the
courts' attitude toward S.B. 1645.
The Habit-Forming Drug Analogy
Although it was not a tort to sell liquor at common law,90 it was
a tort knowingly to sell habit-forming drugs to another's spouse if
the effect of the sale was to cause or aggravate the habitual use of
the drug.91 In 1940 the Supreme Court of Arizona, in Pratt v.
Daly,92 extended this tort liability into the area of intoxicating li-
quors. 93
In Pratt, the defendants were tavern keepers who sold intoxi-
cating liquors to the plaintiff's husband although they knew that
he was an habitual drunkard. The plaintiff voiced her objection to
these sales, and when the defendants persisted, she filed suit
claiming loss of consortium. At trial, the jury awarded the plain-
tiff damages. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
award.
Justice Lockwood, writing for the majority, stated that
there are certain substances which, if used habitually, destroy the volition
of the user to such an extent that he has no power to do aught but con-
sume them when they are placed before him; that the consumption and
the sale of such substances are, therefore, merged and become the act of
the vendor; the sale is, therefore, the proximate cause of the loss ....
The best known of these substances is opium .... but it is a well-known
scientific fact that... the excessive use of intoxicating liquor may, and
frequently does, have the same effect. We think it would be a narrow and
illogical limitation of the rule to hold that because one habit forming sub-
stance is a "drug" in the technical sense of the term, and another is a "li-
quor", different rules should be applied to the use and sale thereof.94
Although this statement seems to impose a broad basis for lia-
bility, its import is narrowed in the remainder of the opinion. The
court stated that although the use of drugs is presumed to destroy
90. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
91. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 543, 104 P.2d 147, 150 (1940). See Holleman v.
Harward, 119 N.C. 150, 25 S.E. 972 (1896); Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327,
98 N.E. 102 (1912); Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917); Hoard v. Peck,
56 Barb. 202 (App. Div. N.Y. 1867).
92. 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).
93. See also Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 163, 290 N.W. 482, 483 (1940) ("inde-
pendent of any specific statute the wife has a cause of action against anyone
wrongfully interfering with the marital relationship regardless of the agency or in-
strumentality employed to inflict the loss").
94. 55 Ariz. at 544-45, 104 P.2d at 151.
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the volition of the user, the use of liquor does not carry the same
presumption. 95 Therefore, before the sale of liquor can constitute
tortious conduct, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the consumer of the
liquor had reached a state in which he lacked the willpower to re-
fuse to drink the liquor, (2) the purveyor knew that the consumer
had reached this state, and (3) despite his knowledge of the con-
sumer's condition, the purveyor continued to furnish the liquor.9 6
Once these conditions exist, the sale and the consumption of the
liquor are merged and become the proximate cause of the dam-
ages.
This reasoning contravenes the clear language of S.B. 1645.
Nevertheless, the exception has been cited in California's '"prior
judicial interpretation."97 If the exception does exist, however,
the class of plaintiffs is restricted to the spouse of the consumer.
This restriction severely limits the utility of the* Pratt exception.
The Duty of a Proprietor
Apart from the rule concerning the sale of intoxicating liquor,
the proprietor of a liquor establishment has a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect his patrons from injuries caused not
only by the conditions of the premises, but also through the negli-
gent acts of other invitees when he has reasonable cause to antici-
pate such acts. 98
The proprietor's duty arises from two considerations. First, the
patron has a right to assume he is in an "orderly house."99 Sec-
ond, the proprietor is in a better position to eliminate the dangers
on his premises. 00 Additionally, the proprietor is held to a high
standard of care because of the dangers connected with large
groups of intoxicated individuals.101 Nonetheless, the proprietor
95. Id. at 545, 104 P.2d at 151.
96. Id.
97. See Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955). In Cole, the majority
opinion cites and distinguishes Pratt. Id. at 353-54, 289 P.2d at 454-55. The dissent-
ing opinion cites Pratt with approval. Id. at 363-65, 289 P.2d at 460-62.
98. Thomas v. Bruza, 151 Cal. App. 2d 150, 154-55, 311 P.2d 128, 131 (1957); 45
Am. JuR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 557 (1969); Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 645 (1960).
99. Thomas v. Bruza, 151 Cal. App. 2d 150, 154, 311 P.2d 128, 131 (1957).
100. Id. at 155, 311 P.2d at 131.
101. 45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 557 (1969).
While the standard of care is that of an ordinarily prudent person, yet it
must be realized that reasonable care is a relative term in that the degree
of care must be commensurate with the risks and dangers attending the
activity being pursued. It is a subject of common knowledge that the con-
is not an insurer of his patron's safety. 0 2 A complaint which al-
leges only that the plaintiffs injury was caused by the proprie-
tor's sale to a pugnacious and quarrelsome patron does not state a
cause of action. 0 3 However, if the proprietor fails to protect his
patron from the violence of known pugnacious, drunken custom-
ers, he is liable for the damages sustained by the innocent pa-
tron. 0 4 Although this duty provides an injured party with an
alternative theory of liability, the utility of the theory ends with
the geographical boundaries of the purveyor's property.
Interference with the Consumer's Customary Duties
This exception to the early common-law rule is stated broadly:
when the continued sale of intoxicating liquors results in a per-
son's inability to perform the duties owing by him to another, the
seller is liable in damages to persons to whom the duty was
owed. 0 5 In point of fact, this exception is not as broad as the
statement indicates. It has been elucidated only in dictum, 106 and
liability has attached only when the purveyor has furnished the
liquor to another's spouse 0 7 or minor child.108
Although the "customary duties" exception has been cited in
the dissenting opinion of a California decision, it has not been fol-
lowed. 0 9 Additionally, the justice citing the exception recognized
its limitation. He stated that unless the person to whom the
sumption of a procession of drinks of intoxicating liquors produces a vari-
ety of reactions in the deportment of human beings, the development of
which emotions the tavern-keeper should be reasonably alert to detect.
Reilly v. 180 Club, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 420, 424, 82 A.2d 210, 212 (1951).
102. Kingen v. Weyant, 148 Cal. App. 2d 656, 661, 307 P.2d 369, 372 (1957); 45 AM.
JuR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 557 (1969).
103.
[I]f the proprietor of a saloon is so negligent as to the character of his pa-
trons who frequent his establishment that he is as likely to cause damage
to his innocent patrons by neglecting to guard them against the violence
of known pugnacious, drunken men and evildoers as by neglecting to pre-
vent a good citizen from falling on a newly waxed floor or from falling
through a trapdoor into his cellar, then he is liable for his negligent failure
to protect the innocent patron.
Thomas v. Bruza, 151 Cal. App. 2d 150, 153-54, 311 P.2d 128, 130-31 (1957).
104. Id.
105. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 361, 289 P.2d 450, 459 (1955) (Carter, J., dissent-
ing); W. WOOLLEN & W. THORNTON, THE LAW OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS § 1029
(1910).
106. Holleman v. Harward, 119 N.C. 150, 25 S.E. 972 (1896); Hoard v. Peck, 56
Barb. 202 (App. Div. N.Y. 1867). These cases concerned the sale of laudanum (an
opium derivative) to a husband's spouse.
107. See note 106 supra.
108. Struble v. Nodwift, 11 Ind. 64 (1858).
109. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 361, 289 P.2d 450, 459-60 (1955) (Carter, J., dis-
senting) (citing W. WOOLLEN & W. THORNTON, THE LAw OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS
§ 1029, at 1837 (1910)).
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buyer owes a duty has a '"peculiar interest" in the buyer, such as
a wife in her husband or parents in their child, and the seller
knows that liquor has injurious effects upon the buyer, the cause
of action is not available." 0
It is submitted that a "peculiar interest" can exist in parties
other than a spouse or a parent. If the purveyor has knowledge of
a peculiar interest, and the injuries that will flow from his inter-
ference with this interest are foreseeable, it is arguable that the
doctrine should be extended.
Senate Bill 1175: The Minors Exception
As a compromise measure to S.B. 1645, California's legislature
passed Senate Bill 1175.111 Governor Brown approved S.B. 1175
on the same day he approved S.B. 1645. S.B. 1175 provides an ex-
ception to the common-law rule that S.B. 1645 reenacts. In perti-
nent part, S.B. 1175 states:
[A] cause of action may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has
suffered injury or death against any [licensee] who sells, furnishes, [or]
gives ... any alcoholic beverage to any obviously intoxicated minor
where the furnishing... is the proximate cause of the personal injury or
death sustained by such person.
1 1 2
Although this cause of action will lessen the impact of S.B. 1645,
its effect will be negligible when compared to the remedies that
were available under Vesely and Coulter.
In 1975, there were 17,000 nationwide arrests of persons under
110. Id.
111. Ch. 930, 1978 Cal. Stats. (to be codified as CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 25602.1-.3).
112. Id. § 1 (emphasis added). Originally, S.B. 1175 provided that only a com-
mercial vendor would be liable to a third party for injuries caused by the furnish-
ing of alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated individuals. Additionally, the
original bill required a plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
vendor had violated CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964) before the plain-
tiff could claim that the defendant was presumptively negligent. The bill was
amended in a joint Senate-Assembly conference on August 23, 1978. By enacting
the original draft of S.B. 1175 the legislature could have immunized the social host
from liability and tempered the liability imposed on the commercial vendor. In-
stead, the legislature exempted both the social host and the commercial vendor
from liability by enacting S.B. 1645.
Critics of S.B. 1645 charged that Governor Brown's approval of S.B. 1645 was the
result of "an unholy alliance ... struck between Governor Brown and the Califor-
nia liquor lobby." L. Daily Journal, Sept. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 6. "It's election year
and the governor is selling out to the liquor interests. To give bar owners com-
plete immunity for tortious acts is completely outrageous." Id. (statement of Sen.
Bob Wilson).
eighteen years of age for driving while under the influence of alco-
hol.n3 In 1976, there were 257,846 adult misdemeanor arrests for
drunk driving reported in California alone." 4 In round figures,
this means that intoxicated adult drivers in California outnum-
bered all intoxicated minor drivers fourteen to one. Conse-
quently, it is clear that S.B. 1175 will not compensate the majority
of persons injured by another's purveyance of alcoholic bever-
ages.
CONCLUSION
The policy considerations examined in this Comment support
the California legislature's exemption of the social host from civil
liability. However, these same policy considerations dictate a
conclusion that the commercial vendor should not be immunized
from civil liability. The commercial vendor can absorb any losses
he might incur by spreading these losses among the buying pub-
lic. The legislature either has failed to recognize or has ignored
this fact. Consequently, an injured party will have to rely upon
exceptions to the common-law rule which may not provide an op-
portunity for adequate compensation. California's next legislative
assembly should remedy this problem by repealing that portion
of S.B. 1645 which exempts the commercial vendor from liability.
DON HALL
113. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154, 577 P.2d 669, 675, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534, 540 (1978) (citing CAT. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIAImIAL JUSTICE PRO-
FILE-1976, at 25).
114. Id. (citing U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, July 11, 1977, at 33).
